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Regional Inequality in Contemporary China 
 
1. Introduction. 
Since 1978, China has been undergoing a process of gradual and incremental reforms 
from a centralized economy to a ‘socialist market economy’.  A significant economic 
growth has accompanied more than two decades of reform.   The average annual growth 
rate of real GDP was 9.8 percent over the years 1978—1998, among the world’s highest 
during the time period.   
 
While the economic growth in China is exceptional during the reform era, it is by no 
means even across the country’s 31 provinces, centrally-administered municipalities and 
autonomous regions. From 1978 to 1998, Fujian (on the eastern coast), the fastest 
growing province, experienced an average annual growth rate of 13.9 percent in real 
GDP; whilst Gansu (on the hinterland), the slowest one, grew only at 6.7 percent.    In 
2000, the top 10 provincial units with the highest GDP per capita were mostly from the 
eastern coast of China.  The GDP per capita in Shanghai (on the eastern coast), the 
country’s highest, was 9.65 times the level of Guizhou (on the inland), the country’s 
lowest.   
 
A question of great interest is whether there exists convergence in real GDP per capita 
across regions in China such that the poor regions are catching up with the rich ones, or 
the poor regions and the rich regions diverge into two clubs such that the gap in the level 
of living standards between the poor and the rich is persistent or even widening.  The 
neoclassical growth theory states that poorer economies tend to grow more rapidly than 
richer ones due to decreasing returns.  The theory predicts absolute convergence across 
economies with similar technologies and preferences, where ‘technology’ here takes a 
broad view that includes production technology, natural resources, institutional factors, 
government policies and etc., see Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995).  Empirically, Barro 
and Sala-I-Martin (1991) find evidence supporting absolute convergence across states in 
the U.S. over the years 1880—1988, as well as across 73 regions in Western Europe over   2
the years 1950—1985.   However, absolute convergence in general does not hold across a 
more heterogeneous group of economies.  Therefore, people turn to investigate 
conditional convergence after controlling for differences in technologies and preferences 
across economies, see Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995).   Under conditional convergence, 
different economies approach different steady states.  Thus the gap in the level of living 
standards between the poor and the rich may be persistent or even widening.  Mankiw, 
Romer and Weil (1992) find evidence for conditional convergence over the years 1960—
1985 across 98, 75 and 22 countries respectively, after controlling for population growth 
and capital accumulation.       
 
China is a huge country that displays enormous spatial disparities in the distribution of 
economic activities, natural resources, local market institutions, local government 
policies and other determinants of income levels and economic growth.  These disparities 
make the issue of convergence especially interesting while more intriguing.  Numerous 
empirical works have been done to study convergence (either absolute or conditional) 
across regions in China.  The specification they utilize in general fall into the framework 
by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995): 
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where  it  is the average growth rate of region i from time 0 to time t,  i x is a vector of 
variables characterizing region i’s technology and preference that determine its steady 
state,  0 i y is region i’s initial real GDP per capita at time 0 and  it u is the error term.   A 
negative   indicates the so-called    convergence.  If   0    and  0   , then there 
exists conditional    convergence; that is, a region’s growth rate is negatively correlated 
with its initial level of real GDP per capita, given other relevant factors fixed.  By 
experimenting with different variables in the vector of i x , current literature provides 
empirical tests of various explanations for the differentials in economic growth across 
regions in China. 
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It has been widely documented that regional inequality has been rising in China since the 
late 1980s due to uneven economic growth across regions.  Figure 1 depicts the evolution 
of regional inequality (measured by the regional Gini coefficient of real consumption 
expenditure per capita) for the period of 1978—1999.  From the figure one can see clear 
trends.   Regional inequality declines from 1978 to 1985 and rises afterwards.      
 























Note:  Data source is Kanbur and X. Zhang (2001).  Regional inequality is measured by the regional Gini 
coefficient (in percentage points) of real consumption expenditure per capita.  
 
This paper surveys the literature on regional economic inequality in contemporary China 
(i.e., since 1952), with a focus on the reform era (i.e., since 1978) during which China has 
experienced rapid economic growth along with rising income inequality.  The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 summarizes the empirical evidences on 
convergence/ divergence across regions in China.  Section 3 discusses various hypotheses 
to explain the rising regional inequality in China, and briefs the empirical tests of them.  
In section 4, there are policy implications based on the analyses outlined in Section 3.  
 
 
2.  Convergence or Divergence: Empirical Evidence.    4
This section outlines the empirical evidences on regional convergence/ divergence in 
China.  First, let us take a look at the evolution of the pattern of regional inequality since 
1952. 
 
2.1 Trends in regional convergence/ divergence: a historical review 
China has been subject to several distinctive policy regimes since 1952.  Following Jian, 
Sachs and Warner (1996), I divide contemporary Chinese economic history into three 
periods that reflect dramatic differences in basic economic policies.  They are: the period 
of central planning and the push for industrialization, 1952—1965; the Cultural 
Revolution, 1966—1977; and the reform era, 1978—present.  Empirical studies in the 
literature have found that during different periods, the country exhibits distinctive 
tendencies towards regional convergence. 
 
Central planning and the push for industrialization: 1952—1965 
This period includes the first 5-year plan based on Soviet-style central planning (1953—
1957), the Great Leap Forward (1958—1961) and a return to modified central planning 
(1962—1965).  The distinctive feature of this period is the Soviet-style industrialization 
and a bias against agricultural regions.  Jian, Sachs and Warner (1996) test both the 
  convergence and the    convergence in real GDP per capita during this period.   
They find only weak evidence for convergence.  Specifically, for    convergence, they 
find that the regional dispersion of real GDP per capita measured by the standard 
deviation of the log of real GDP per capita fell slightly during this period. Their 
regression based on Eq. (1) reports an insignificant and negative , suggesting only weak 
absolute    convergence.   After including the initial share of agriculture in GDP as an 
additional explanatory variable, they find a negative  that is almost significant, which 
indicates conditional convergence.  The results confirms the conjecture that the push for 
industrialization was a driving force towards regional divergence, since agricultural 
provinces started with lower than average incomes and received disproportionately small 
share of centrally allocated resources for industrialization.    
 
The Cultural Revolution: 1966—1977   5
During the Cultural Revolution, central planning was disrupted as a result of Mao 
Zedong’s purge of the central government bureaucracy.  Regions in China were forced 
into autarky.  Agricultural production was distorted and damaged because economic 
incentives were almost fully replaced by bureaucratic controls.  The economic growth in 
agricultural regions stagnated.  Meanwhile, heavy industrialization was continued in the 
Northeast and the East (i.e., Liaoning, Tianjin and Shanghai).  The empirical analysis of 
Jian, Sachs and Warner (1996) shows strong evidence for divergence across provinces 
during this period.   They find that the regional dispersion of real GDP per capita rose 
steadily and significantly.  Moreover, their regression based on Eq. (1) reports a 
significant and positive .   Kanbur and X. Zhang (2001) confirm the divergence trend in 
this period, by showing that the Cultural Revolution marks one the three peaks of 
regional income inequality over the past 50 years in China. 
 
The reform era: 1978-- 
Empirical evidence shows that since 1978, China’s economic growth has been exhibiting 
conditional convergence across regions.  For example, Cai, Wang and Du (2002) find 
conditional convergence of real GDP per capita between 1978 and 1998, holding constant 
other relevant factors such as the investment rate, initial human capital, market distortion 
and etc.  Based on data over 1978—1995, Yao and Z. Zhang (2001) report conditional 
convergence of real GDP per capita, after controlling for the investment rate, the ratio of 
export to GDP, population growth rate, and a proxy for the geographical distance to the 
coast.  J. Chen and Fleisher (1996) show evidence for conditional convergence of per 
capita production from 1978—1993 after controlling for employment growth rate, the 
investment rates of physical capital and human capital and the dummy variable for the 
coast.  Raiser (1998) finds conditional convergence of income per capita between 1978 
and 1992.  Gundlach (1997) finds conditional convergence of output per worker between 
1979 and 1989.   
 
The most striking feature of China’s economic growth in the reform era is the formation 
of geo-economic clubs.  The existence of geo-economic clubs must meet two conditions, 
according to Yao and Z. Zhang (2001): 1) output per capita within each club converges to    6
a long-term stationary state; 2) output per capita  between clubs diverges so that the rich 
become richer and the poor become poorer.  Officially, China’s provincial units are 
divided into three groups geographically: West, East and Central.  The West includes: 
Sichuan, Shannxi, Guizhou, Xinjiang, Tibet, Yunan, Gansu, Qinghai, and Ningxia.  The 
Central includes: Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner-Mongolia, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Jiangxi, 
Hubei, and Hunan.  The East includes: Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Shanghai, Hebei, 
Shandong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, and Guangxi
1.  Yao and Z. 
Zhang (2001) conduct several tests on the existence of geo-economic clubs in China 
since the reforms.  Through a regression based on Eq. (1), they find significant evidence 
for conditional convergence, after controlling for the proxy for the distance to the coast, 
indicating within group convergence in economic growth.   According to their estimation, 
the East grew faster than the Central and the West by 35% and 65% respectively.   Thus, 
the rich East regions became richer and richer relative to the rest of the country.  They 
also carry out a unit root test, through which they show that the regions in the East 
converge to a long-term stochastic stationary state as well as the regions in the West, but 
not the regions in the Central.  In summary, their results strongly support the view that 
China has diverged in to two geo-economic clubs, the East and the West, since the 
reforms. 
 
In 1995, the 5th section of the 14
th Plenary of the Chinese Communist Party declared that 
regional inequalities had widened since the reforms.  However, it is worth noting that at 
different phases of the reform era, the pattern of regional inequalities in China exhibits 
distinctive features.  During the first phase of the reform era, 1978—1989, there was a 
steady decline in the regional dispersion of real GDP per capita (e.g., Jian, Sachs and 
Warner (1996), Hu and Wang (1996) and Dayal-Gulati and Husain (2000)).  This time 
period was punctuated by China’s first significant reforms, the rural reforms.  The rural 
reforms triggered a one-time spurt in agricultural productivity, mainly between 1978 and 
1985, as agricultural production rebounded after the disastrous commune system.   
Moreover, the reforms led to rapid growth of the township and village enterprises (TVEs), 
                                                 
1 In the literature, it is also common to divide China into two geographical groups: Coast and Inland, with 
the Coast consisting of all the provincial units in the East group (e.g., J. Chen and Fleisher (1996), Jian, 
Sachs and Warner (1996) and Kanbur and X. Zhang (1999)).     7
which continue to fuel rural growth today.  Because agricultural regions started out below 
average and benefited disproportionately from the rural reforms, the rural reforms were 
the main driving force towards regional convergence.  Not-surprisingly, there was strong 
evidence for convergence across provinces that was associated with rural reforms during 
the first phase of the reform era, see, e.g., Jian, Sachs and Warner (1996). 
 
Since 1990, the regional dispersion of real GDP per capita has been rising, mainly due to 
the widening gap between the coastal provinces and the inland provinces.   For instance, 
Jian, Sachs and Warner (1996) find that the standard deviation of the log of real GDP per 
capita increased steadily between 1990 and 1993.  They divide China’s provincial units 
into two groups, the Coast and the Inland, and then decompose the regional variance of 
real GDP per capita accordingly.   They show that the variance between the Coast and the 
Inland contributed to most of the increase in the regional variance during the time period, 
while the variance within the Coast declined significantly.  A simple convergence 
regression based on Eq. (1) reports that being a coastal region (with coastal dummy 
value=1) might increase the annual growth rate by 7.4 percentage points during 1990—
1993.  In contemplating the causes of the rising regional inequality during the second 
phase of the reform era, one should keep the following in mind: 1) this time period has 
witnessed the enormous (positive) impact of China’s open-door policies on the 
development of the coastal regions; 2) at the start of this time period, China’s focus of 
reforms switched from rural to urban.  For more discussions on this, please see Section 3.      
 
2.2 Decomposition of income inequality 
Before the early 1980s, China was among the world’s most egalitarian societies with 
income inequality much lower than the world average.  However, since 1985, income 
inequality has risen significantly.  China’s consumption inequality, measured by the Gini 
coefficient, was 0.376 in 1992 (World Bank (1996)).  And it increased to 0.415 in 1995, 
making the 37
th highest among 96 countries all over the world (World Bank (2000)).  ‘so 
steep a rise in inequality in such a short time is highly unusual in both the historical and 
the comparative perspective’, according to World Bank (1997).  Many recent studies use 
the decomposition of the Gini coefficient (or the GE coefficient, defined later) to analyze   8
income clubs in China (e.g., Kanbur and X. Zhang (1999) and Yao and Z. Zhang (2001, 
2003)).  The decomposition analyses help us understand how regional inequalities 
contribute to the increase in the total income inequality in China.  Moreover, they throw 
light on how regional inequalities are composed of and what are the causes of the rising 
regional inequalities.   
 
Next, let us briefly review the inequality measures and the decomposition methodology.  
The Gini coefficient can be decomposed as 
 
(2)      ,
O B W G G G G     
 
where 
W G is the within-group Gini, 
B G  is the between-group Gini, and 
O G is the residual 
arising when the income ranges of two different groups overlap.  In addition to the Gini 
coefficient, a family of generalized entropy coefficients is also used to measure income 
inequality in the literature.  According to Shorrocks (1980, 1984), the GE coefficient is 
defined as 
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where y refers to the sample of income of the total population,  i y is i’s income,  ) ( i y s is 
the share of i’s population in the total population, n is the cardinality of the total 
population, and c is a constant.  A nice feature of the GE coefficient is that it is additively 
decomposable across groups.  If c=0, as in most of the cases in the literature, then the GE 
coefficient can be decomposed as, given that the total population is divided into M groups, 
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where  m s  is the share of group m’s population in the total population,  ) ( m y I is group m’s 
GE coefficient,  m  is group m’s mean income,  m e  is  an  m n   -th vector, and 
) ,..., ( 1 1 M Me e I    is the population GE when all the individual incomes in each group are 
replaced by the group mean.  The first item on the RHS of the equation measures the 
within-group inequality, while the second item measures the between-group inequality.  
Next I will outline the empirical findings obtained via decomposition analysis.    
 
Rural-urban inequality 
The rural-urban inequality contributes to a major part of the overall income inequality in 
China.  The rural-urban gap has been widening since mid 1980s, which has an important 
impact on China’s rising income inequality.  Kanbur and X. Zhang (1999)’s analysis is 
based on real rural and urban consumption expenditures per capita at the provincial level. 
Their data covers 28 Chinese provinces over the years 1983—1995.  During this period, 
the overall regional inequality increased by 25 percent in the term of the Gini coefficient 
and by 49 percent in the term of the GE coefficient.   After decomposing the GE 
coefficient across rural and urban groups, they find that the rural-urban inequality 
measured by the between-group GE contributed to more than 70 percent of the overall 
regional inequality.  Moreover, between 1983 and 1995, the rural-urban inequality rose 
by 29 percent from 0.062 to 0.085, which accounted for 56 percent of the increase in the 
overall regional inequality.  Meanwhile, the percentage contribution of the urban 
inequality across provinces increased by almost 100 percent from 2 to 4 percentage 
points.  And the percentage contribution of the rural inequality across provinces rose 
significantly as well; that is, by 27.6 percent from 19.8 to 25.3 percentage points.     
Considering the inland areas claimed a large percentage contribution to the overall 
inequality during the time period (48.9 percent in 1995), they also decompose the 
inequality in the inland areas across rural and urban groups.  The results show that the 
rural-urban inequality in the inland areas widened by 30 percent, which accounted for 90 
percent of the increase inequality in the inland areas during the period.    Yang (1999)   10
uses the household survey data of 1986, 1988, 1992 and 1994 of China’s Sichuan and 
Jiangsu provinces to conduct his empirical analysis.  He finds that the overall income 
inequality rose markedly between 1986 and 1994 for both provinces.  The decomposition 
analysis of the Gini coefficient across rural and urban groups shows that the widening 
rural-urban gap contributed to 82 percent of the increase of the overall income inequality 
in Jiangsu and almost 100 percent in Sichuan.  The decomposition of the GE coefficient 
generates smaller but still impressive percentage points of the contribution of rural-urban 
inequality, with 51 percent for Jiangsu and 73 percent for Sichuan.    Based on the 
national level data, Yang and Zhou (1999) find a significant increase in the rural-urban 
income disparity over the years.   A World Bank (1997) study shows that the rural-urban 
income gap is responsible for a third of China’s total inequality in 1995 and a half of the 
increase in inequality since 1985.  
   
Coastal-inland inequality 
Decomposition analysis across geographical groups confirms the existence of geo-
economic clubs. The differential between the inland and the coastal region has been 
rising rapidly since the reforms, which has become the major driving force towards 
regional divergence.  After decomposing the GE coefficient of real consumption per 
capita across coastal and inland groups,  Kanbur and X. Zhang (1999) find that over 
1983—1995, the coastal-inland inequality widened by 300 percent from 0.005 to 0.021, 
which accounted for 39 percent of the increase in the overall regional inequality.       
Meanwhile, the percentage contribution of the coastal-inland inequality to the overall 
inequality increased sharply by 168.5 percent from 6.45 to 17.33 percentage points.  The 
percentage contribution of the within-coastal inequality declined by 5.5 percent from 
35.72 to 33.77 percentage points.  And the percentage contribution of the within-inland 
inequality declined even more; that is, by 15.4 percent from 57.82 to 48.9 percentage 
points.  Considering that the rural areas claimed a large share of contribution to the 
overall inequality during the time period (25.3 percentage points in 1995), they also 
decompose the inequality of the rural areas over coastal and inland groups.  The results 
show that the coastal-inland inequality within the rural areas widened by more than 200 
percent, which accounted for 65 percent of the increase in the rural inequality across   11
provinces.    Yao and Z. Zhang (2001) divide the Chinese provinces into three groups, the 
East, the Central and the West.  They then decompose the Gini coefficient over the three 
groups based on data of real GDP per capita over the years 1952—1997.  They find a 
clear divergence pattern after 1967, which became even more significant after 1990.  The 
share of the within-group inequality decreased to 20 percentage points by the end of the 
period while the share of the between-group inequality rose to almost 80 percent 
percentage points.  The overlapping residual fell to below 2 percentage points.  In a more 
recent paper,    Yao and Z. Zhang (2003) calculated the GE coefficient of the real GDP 
per capita and decompose it across the aforementioned three groups.  They investigate the 
evolution of the ratios of between-group inequality to within-group inequality over the 
years 1952—1997.   Their results show: 1) both the ratios of the East-West inequality to 
the within-East inequality and  the within-West inequality rose since the reforms, with the 
increase becoming more significant after 1990; 2) both the ratios of the East-Central 
inequality to the within-East inequality and  the within-Central inequality rose since the 
reforms, especially after 1990; 3) there was no clear time trend for either of the ratios of 
the Central-West inequality to the within-Central inequality and the within-West 
inequality.  Their findings suggest that the East has formed a (high-income) club since 
the reforms. However, there is no evidence showing divergence between the West and 
the Central.  They might belong to a single (low-income) club. 
 
2.3   Regional disparities of urban income 
In this subsection, I briefly review some of the empirical works on urban income 
disparities across regions in China.  Using data at the provincial-urban level,   Kanbur 
and X. Zhang (1999) find that the disparity of real urban consumption per capita across 
provinces increased by almost 100 percent between 1983 and 1995.  Moreover, such an 
increase accounted for 11 percent of the increase in the overall regional inequality during 
the same period.     
 
Although most studies of regional inequalities in the literature are based on provincial 
level data, empirical analysis of growth at the city level is especially pertinent to China 
for the following three reasons.  First, government preferential policies towards certain   12
regions are directly enacted at the city level.  Thus examining the performances of cities 
is appropriate to evaluate the effects of those policies.  Second, cities may serve as 
growth engines for surrounding regions through spillover effects.  A better understanding 
of inter-city inequalities helps understand regional growth inequalities.  Third, at the city 
level, data of 1980s and 1990s indicate more severe disparities in the growth rate of per 
capita income than at the province level, see, Jones, Li and Owen (2003).   This suggests 
that aggregating data at the province level may disguise some noteworthy relationships. 
There are a few studies in the literature exploring China’s inter-city inequalities of 
economic growth.   Jones, Li and Owen (2003) investigate why growth rates are different 
across cities in China.  They utilize data of income per capita for 200 cities over the years 
1989—1999.  Through a standard convergence regression similar to Eq. (1),   they find 
significant evidence for conditional convergence.  More importantly, government 
preferential policies enhanced economic growth to a larger extent than at the province 
level.  Based on their estimations, on average, cities in a special economic zone (SEZ) 
enjoyed an annual growth rate 5.5 percentage points higher than other cities, and open 
coastal cities had a growth rate 3 percentage points higher than others.  These results are 
consistent with the findings of geo-economic clubs presented earlier. While they find a 
significant and positive impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on growth, surprisingly 
their results show no significant effect of domestic investment in either physical or 
human capital, which indicates inefficiencies that needs to be further explored by future 
research.  In a related paper, Song, Chu and Cao (2000) use city level data of 1985 and 
1991 to study regional inequalities.  Their focus is on the determinants of the level of 
income at a point in time, not the dynamic growth rate.  They find that being an open 
coastal city or a SEZ city had a positive impact on the income (or GDP) per capita, while 
the share of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) had a negative impact.   
 
Looking further into the urban income structure, Xu and Zou (2000) address a  different 
question: how and why urban income distributions vary across regions in China.  Their 
work throws light on the variation of income inequality across section, as well as on the 
relationship between income inequality and economic growth.  Specifically, they use data 
on the income distribution of urban residents across 29 provinces over the years 1985—  13
1995.  The data provides average incomes for consecutive percentiles.  They then 
calculate the Gini coefficient and other income inequality indices for each province at 
each time.     They find that while most provinces experienced a positive and significant 
growth in urban income inequality during the period, the pattern of the change was by no 
means similar across provinces.  By running regressions of income inequality on a bunch 
of explanatory variables, they find: 1) GDP growth, inflation, and foreign trade have a 
significant and positive impact on the level of income inequality; 2) the share of SOEs is 
negatively related to the level of income inequality.  They find no evidence showing any 
significant effect of either schooling or urbanization.   Gustafsson and Shi (2001) also 
find that the rich East regions have a higher urban income inequality than the West, based 
on household survey data of 1988 and 1995 across 10 provinces.     
 
 
3.  Causes of the Rising of Regional Inequality. 
What has caused the rising of regional inequality in China? Numerous studies in the 
literature have explored the underlying reasons.  They not only investigate the spatial 
variations in technologies and preferences that caused differentials in economic growth, 
but also address the puzzling question: why were the spillover effects generated by the 
rich regions too weak to lead the poor regions to catch up? Or put it in another way, why 
did Deng Xiaoping’s ‘step ladder strategy’ fail to work?  Many explanations are provided 
for the increasing regional inequality, along with empirical tests.  They fall mainly into 
the following seven categories: government policies, openness to the world market (FDI 
and export), market integration, public infrastructures, education attainment, geographical 
factors and migration.  Next, I will discuss these seven factors one by one.  
 
3.1 Government policies 
China’s transition process since 1978 is marked by a series of gradual and incremental 
reforms.  The timing and significance of China’s reform policies have profound influence 
on the evolution of regional inequalities. 
 
Regional development strategies   14
China gradually opened its economy after 1978.  In 1980, China established four SEZs in 
two coastal provinces: Guangdong and Fujian.  In the SEZs, private firms and foreign-
invested firms were granted considerable privileges such as tax incentives, exemption 
from import duty on intermediate inputs, the right to retain some or all of the foreign 
exchange earnings, and the flexibility of employment.  The development of the SEZs was 
so successful that the central government decided to set up another 14 open coastal cities 
in 1984, opened Hainan in 1988 and set up Shanghai Pudong Development Zone in 1989.  
In 1988, the government introduced a coastal region’s development strategy and the two-
ends outside policy, which aimed to encourage processing trade in order to exploit 
China’s abundant labor resource.  Export-oriented FDI was encouraged by such policies 
as tax holidays and tax rebates for exports.  As a result, FDI and exports increased rapidly 
in the coastal regions, which helped China become a main trading country in the world 
and the largest recipient of FDI among the developing countries.  Following Deng 
Xiaoping’s call for more opening of China and for economic acceleration in 1992, more 
cities (including major inland cities) were opened and many preferential policies were 
given to foreign investors.  However, the coastal regions benefited more from this push 
than the inland regions, not only because they have advantageous geographical conditions 
to attract FDI, but also because they had already developed social and economic 
environments more appealing to FDI than the inland regions at this stage, thanks to the 
regional development strategies in the 1980s.              
  
China’s regional development strategies have contributed directly to the rising of regional 
inequalities.  Due to the preferential policies, investments, both domestic and foreign, 
were highly concentrated in the coastal regions.  In addition, the open-door policies 
helped introduce more advanced technologies and management skills to the coastal 
regions.  Industrial agglomeration took place and the coastal regions enjoyed high growth 
rates driven by scale economies.   Golley (2002) identifies industrial agglomeration (a so-
called ‘cumulative causation effect’) in five southeastern provinces using data covering 
22 industrial sectors of the period 1989—1994.  Meanwhile, vast volume of labor 
migration was attracted to the coastal regions from the inland.  The coastal regions gained 
the momentum from the regional development strategies for an initial takeoff in the   15
1980s, which in turn led to persistently higher than average growth rates in the 1990s due 
to the effects of agglomeration and increasing returns, see Litwack and Qian (1998).  For 
various reasons to be discussed later, spillover effects were not strong enough to lead the 
inland regions to catch up with the rich coastal regions.  Thus widening coastal-inland 
income inequality resulted.  Empirical evidences support the view that preferential 
investment and trade policies are important determinants of growth differentials in China 
(e.g. Demurger et al. (2002)).    
 
Urban-biased policies 
The urban reforms in China that started in 1985 were far more complicated and difficult 
than the initial rural reforms.  Due to concerns for economic and political stability, the 
government installed a set of urban-biased fiscal and monetary policies after 1985.   
Urban price subsidies totaled 71.2 billion yuan in 1998, which was 7.6 percent of 
government’s budget.   The government also subsidized the urban-based, loss-making 
SOEs. Such subsidies totaled 232.5 billion yuan for the period 1986—1990 and 206.1 
billion yuan for the period 1991—1995, which accounted for 19 percent and 9 percent of 
the government’s revenue, respectively (Yang (2002)).  The shares of the budget devoted 
to cities ranged from 52 percent to 62 percent for the period of 1986—1992 (Yang 
(1999)).  In addition to fiscal transfers, the urban state sector received preferential credit 
allocations that caused redistributions of income in favor of the urban areas, too.      
 
The urban –biased fiscal and monetary policies have led to a steady increase in the rural-
urban inequality, which in turn has contributed to a large part of the rising inequality in 
China after 1985, see Section 2.2.  Regions in China vary widely in the urbanization rate. 
Because provinces with a higher level of GDP per capita in general have higher 
urbanization rates, the widening rural-urban inequality is translated into the rising 
regional inequality (e.g., A. Chen (2002), Demurger (2001), Fu (2004) and Yang (2002)).   
   
Reforms of SOEs 
China’s state sector has been lagging behind the non-state sector in economic growth 
during the reform era.  Between 1978 and 1993, the share of SOEs in industrial output   16
dropped from 78 percent to 43 percent.  In 1994, most of the SOEs had excess 
employment and close to half of them were loss-makers.  Yet the SOEs continued to 
consume a great portion of bank credit and resources.  It had become evident that the lack 
of fundamental SOE reforms had seriously undermined China’s development (Cao, Qian 
and Weingast(1999)).  In 1995, China started a profound reform in privatizing and 
restructuring its SOEs, proceeding in three areas: 1) privatization of small SOEs at the 
county level;  2) mass lay-offs of SOE workers at the city level; and 3) mergers, 
conglomerations, corporatizations and initial public offerings of some large SOEs which 
often involve the central government.  The reforms in the first two areas, driven mainly 
by local governments, have proceeded relatively smoothly with fewer social problems 
than expected.                 
 
The reforms of SOEs have notable influences on regional inequality.  The rich coastal 
regions have comparative advantages over the poor inland regions during the reforms of 
SOEs.  First, the rich regions have larger shares of private sector, which makes the 
reemployment of laid-off workers from SOEs relatively easier.  Second, the rich regions 
have more financial resources and other resources to support the privatization and 
restructuring of SOEs.  Third,   both labor market and capital market institutions are more 
mature and developed in the rich regions to facilitate the privatization and restructuring 
of SOEs.   
 
Moreover, the reforms of large SOEs contain more difficult economic and political 
problems and remain one of the biggest challenges to China in the years to come.  As 
Renard (2002) points out, the reforms of SOEs in China will be accompanied by greater 
unemployment in the next years and will probably increase regional inequality because 
large SOEs are concentrated in those provinces that have already lagged behind the rich 
coastal provinces in economic growth. 
 
Fiscal decentralization 
China has gone through fiscal reforms to decentralize its fiscal system since the 
beginning of the reform era.  In 1980, China implemented the policy of  fenzhaochifan   17
(“eating in different kitchens”), aiming to separate the central and local budgets.   
Budgetary contracts between the central and local governments were established which 
often varied by regions and were subject to renegotiations when circumstances changed.   
The contracting system hardens local budget constraints and improves fiscal efficiencies, 
because marginal central taxation rates drop well below 100 percent and this provides 
incentives for local governments to increase their revenues and allocate their spendings 
more efficiently.  During the process of fiscal decentralization, local governments 
develop power and their relationships with local enterprises strengthen.    
  
Fiscal decentralization has impacted China’s regional inequality through various channels. 
One is that, as Young (2000) points out, fiscal decentralization, combined with distorted 
price systems and duplicated (and often inefficient) industry structures across regions, 
leads to inter-regional trade protection and fragmented domestic markets due to local 
governments’ rent-seeking behaviors.  Qiu et al. (2003) develop a theoretical model to 
demonstrate that fiscal decentralization and international trade protection together give 
rise to inter-regional trade protection.    As discussed in Section 3.7 later, inter-regional 
trade protection can widen the regional gap in China. 
  
Another concern is that China’s fiscal decentralization may have gone so fast and so far 
that national priorities have been crowded out in public spending by local public projects, 
which could hurt growth.   Some public infrastructures crucial to economic growth are 
better provided by the central government, such as high ways, railways,     
telecommunication, and power.  This is because 1) their production technologies dictate 
that it is more efficient to produce them at a national scale; 2) Such infrastructures 
involve large inter-regional externalities and local provision of them may lead to 
underproduction; 3) Since fiscal decentralization, local governments in china assume two 
sometimes conflicting roles, public good provider and entrepreneur. This may lead to 
irrational behaviors of local governments.  T. Zhang and Zou (1998) provide supportive 
evidence showing that in China, the share of central government development spending 
has a positive impact on economic growth while the share of provincial government 
development spending is negatively related to growth.  Using data across 28 Chinese   18
provinces over the period of 1980—1992, they find a significant and negative 
relationship between the degree of fiscal decentralization (measured by the ratio of local 
budgetary spending to central budgetary spending) and provincial economic growth.     
Differences in the degree of fiscal decentralization across regions lead to spatial 
variations in economic growth in China.   
 
Lastly, since decentralization, local governments’ capacity to finance public goods 
production mainly depends on local revenues and their ability to negotiate with the 
central government.  This varies a lot spatially, which in turn leads to variations in 
economic growth across regions.     
 
There are some direct empirical evidences showing that fiscal decentralization has 
exacerbated regional inequality in China.  Tsui (1991) uses a graph analysis based on 
data up to 1985 to demonstrate that decentralization raised regional inequality.  Kanbur 
and X. Zhang (2002) examines the time series of regional inequality measured by the GE 
coefficient over the period of 1952—1999.  They find that decentralization (measured by 
1- ratio of central government revenues to total government revenues) had a significant 
and positive effect on the degree of regional inequality; and it especially widened the 
rural-urban inequality.   However, it reduced the coastal-inland inequality, intriguingly.   
To gain more insight on this matter, further empirical analyses need to be done in the 
future based on more refined measures of decentralization and more disaggregated data.  
 
3.2  FDI and export 
FDI and export, closely related to China’s reforms and open-door policies, are two major 
driving forces behind its economic growth.  According to the standard growth theory, 
FDI helps a region with the accumulation of capital and enhances its adoption of more 
advanced technologies from abroad.  Moreover, in China, FDI is closely related to export.   
For example, in 1999, exports of foreign invested enterprises accounted for 45 percent of 
the country’s total exports, see Fu (2004).   Export helps a region achieve its comparative 
advantages through specialization and enjoy economies of scale.  It may also alleviate a 
region’s foreign exchange constraints and thus allow the region to import more advanced   19
materials and machinery.  Due to various social, economic and geographical reasons, 
such as the central government’s regional development strategies, the spatial distribution 
of FDI and export are by no means even in China.  According to Fu, 83.7 percent of the 
country’s total FDI was concentrated in the coastal regions by 1999.  Meanwhile, the 
costal regions claimed 90 percent of the country’s total exports.  The average ratio of 
export to GDP was 25 percent in the coastal regions and only 4.8 percent in the inland 
regions in 1999.  Plenty of empirical evidences show that the uneven spatial distribution 
of FDI and export has contributed significantly to the rising of regional inequality in 
China, see, e.g., Brun and Renard (2002), Demurger (2001), Fu (2004), and Fujita and Hu 
(2001). 
 
Fu (2004) explores the spillover effect of export as growth engine.  She finds that export 
has been the major driving force of economic growth for the coastal regions, but not for 
the inland regions.  More importantly, she reports that the export-led growth in the 
coastal regions has an insignificant spillover effect on the inland regions, which 
reinforces the widening regional gap.   She argues that the reason for the weak spillover 
effect lies in the structure of the export sector; that is, a large portion of the coastal 
exports are through processing trade, which has limited backward linkages towards the 
inland regions.  
 
3.3 Market integration 
Inter-regional trade protection has become a serious problem in China since the reforms, 
which is reflected by all kinds of barriers to trade erected by local governments to protect 
local businesses against outside competition, such as special charges levied at roadblocks, 
outright prohibition, and legal and financial restrictions on marketing non-local goods.  
As a result, domestic markets become fragmented.  Young (2000) finds a clear 
divergence trend in regional prices in the late 1980s, followed by alternating rounds of 
convergence and divergence in the 1990s without overall trend.   
 
The deterioration of market integration in China worsens regional inequality.  Market 
fragmentation prevents regions from developing proper industry structures based on   20
comparative advantages.  As supportive evidence, Young (2000) reports a convergence in 
the structure of output across regions combined with a divergence in factor intensities 
during China’s reform era.  Notice that the lack of an integrated domestic market has less 
negative impact on the coastal regions than on the inland regions, because the coastal 
regions can achieve specialization and enjoy scale economies and increasing returns 
through international trade, which sustains economic growth.  This contributes to the 
ever-growing gap between the coastal and inland regions.  Moreover, the spillover effect 
from the rich regions to the poor regions is weakened by a fragmented domestic market, 
which also strengthens the tendency towards regional divergence.    
 
That trade has important impact on economic growth is endorsed by the growing 
literature of international trade.  Moreover, if markets themselves are viewed as economic 
institutions, studying the effect of market integration mirrors the new emphasis on the 
importance of institutions for growth in the literature.  However, few empirical studies 
have examined the relationship between market integration and economic growth in 
China.  Due to various geographical, social and economic reasons, the degree of market 
integration varies significantly both across regions and across sectors in China.  This 
provides a natural context to test the relationship between market integration and 
economic growth cross section, the results of which will deepen our understanding on the 
patterns of regional and sector growth disparities.  A notable exception by Keller and 
Shiu (2004) examines the degree of integration of rice markets in China’s 12 provinces 
between 1723 and 1993.  It finds that the degree of rice market integration in the 1720s is 
a very good predictor of per capita income in the 1990s; namely, regions with higher 
degrees of market integration in the 1720s had higher per capita income in the 1990s.   
    
It is worth noting that as China becomes more and more integrated into the global 
economy, the country’s regional inequality would decline.  Kanbur and X. Zhang (2001) 
find empirical evidence showing a negative relationship between China’s openness to the 
world (measured by the reduction in the effective tariff rate) and regional inequality.  Qiu 
et al. (2003) argues that local governments have less incentive to impose inter-regional   21
trade barriers when the nation’s external trade barrier is lower.  These studies imply that 
access to WTO has a reversal effect on China’s rising regional inequality. 
 
3.4 Public infrastructures 
Investment in public infrastructures, including transport services, telecommunication, 
power and etc., can enhance the total factor productivity growth by facilitating market 
transactions and the realization of externalities among firms or industries.   In the case of 
China, transportation and telecommunication infrastructures may be of particular 
importance because the country is of huge distances and diverse geo-topographical 
features (even within the same province).  Moreover, industrial activities tend to be 
located far away from energy and raw material resources such as coal and natural gas.  In 
addition, technological progress is often imported from abroad and spread from the open 
and more developed east regions to the west through spillovers.   
 
Public infrastructures are unevenly distributed across regions in China.  This might be a 
legacy from the pre-reform era.  For example, the province of Liaoning that is 
concentrated in heavy industries has average railway length of 24 km  per  1000 
2 km  
(Demurger (2001)), well above the national average 13.  It might also be attributed to the 
decentralization since the reforms because different regions have different capacities to 
invest in public infrastructures, as discussed earlier.   For example, in Guangdong, a rich 
coastal province, the highway density is 372 km per 1000 
2 km , well above the national 
average 237.  In Qinghai, a poor northwestern province, the highway density is only 23 
km  per  1000 
2 km (Demurger (2001)).   In addition, there are geographic factors.   
Differences in public infrastructures are an important determinant of differences in 
economic growth across regions.   
 
A few empirical works study the relationship between infrastructure development and 
economic growth in China.  Chen and Fleisher (1997) investigate how the transportation 
route length influences both the level and growth of total factor productivity in Chinese 
provinces from 1978 to 1993.  Mody and Wang (1997) find that both road network length 
and telecommunication facilities had positive and significant effects on growth for seven   22
coastal provinces from 1985 to 1989.   A recent paper by Demurger (2001) uses a larger 
database (covering 24 provinces from 1985 to 1998) and more comprehensive 
infrastructure indicators than previous studies.  The indicator of transportation 
infrastructure is the density ( km /1000
2 km ) of railway, road and inland navigable 
waterway networks.  The indicator of telecommunication infrastructure is the number of 
telephones per 1000 people. After controlling for other relevant variables, the paper finds 
a nonlinear relationship between the transportation indicator and growth.  The effect of 
transportation infrastructure is significantly positive and exhibits diminishing returns.   
Estimations also indicate that telecommunication infrastructure has a significant and 
(although less than that of transportation infrastructure) and positive effect on growth.  
Moreover, the development of telecommunication in the rural areas (measured by number 
of villages with access to telephone services) has a positive impact on growth.     
 
3.5 Education attainment 
Education attainment is often used to measure the level of human capital.  Human capital 
plays an important role in economic growth, especially endogenous growth models 
(Barro (1995) and Lucas (1988)).  Empirical evidence based on data across countries 
show a significant and positive relationship between education attainment and economic 
growth (e.g., Barro (1991)).  Will the positive relationship hold across regions in China? 
Plenty of empirical analyses have addressed this question in the literature.  For instance,   
Cai, Wang and Du (2002) show a positive and significant relationship between the initial 
human capital (measured by log average years of school in 1982) and the growth of GDP 
per capita, using data across 29 provinces over the period 1978—1998.  Demurger (2001) 
finds that the impact of human capital (measured by the proportion of total population 
with at least secondary education) on regional growth of GDP per capita was positive and 
significant over 1985—1998.  Also, according to Chen and Fleisher (1997), the initial 
human capital (measured by the ratio of university graduates to total population) has a 
significant and positive effect on both the level and growth of total factor productivity.  
Another paper by Chen and Fleisher (1996) reports a positive but insignificant 
relationship between the growth of GDP per capita and the investment rate of human 
capital (measured by the percentage of total population enrolled in secondary school).    23
The confirmed positive effect of the initial human capital on growth implies that regional 
disparities in education attainment generate variations in economic growth. 
 
Although education attainment varies a lot across regions in China, few studies in the 
literature have explored the determinants of the spatial variations in education attainment, 
which has become an increasingly important matter in recent years.  On one hand, 
evidences indicate that productive characteristics are increasingly rewarded as the labor 
market develops with the deepening of market-oriented reforms.    In particular, the 
return to education increases dramatically, which accounted for 40 percent of the total 
increase in the level of urban wage between 1988 and 1995, and 11 percent of the total 
increase in urban wage inequality (Knight and Song (2003)).     On the other hand, 
segmentation and discrimination grow in the labor market.  In particular, spatial 
segmentation (reinforced by restrictions on migration) accounted for 33 percent of the 
total increase in urban wage inequality (Knight and Song (2003)).   The two factors 
together should have profound influence on households’ investment decisions, which in 
turn determine regional disparities in education attainment.    More research needs to be 
done on this matter in the future.  
  
3.6  Geographic factors 
Geographic effects on regional economic growth in China have been explored in the 
literature.  A recent paper by Chang et al. (2002) applies the new geographic theory to 
study the experiences of China since the reforms.   The paper develops a theoretical 
model different from a canonical neoclassical growth model to explain the regional 
growth pattern in China.  The model is based on two assumptions that hold true 
particularly in China during the transitional period: 1) unlimited supply of capital from 
overseas 2) unlimited labor supply from the rural surplus labor
2.  According to the model, 
in the context of market reforms and open-door policies, the geo-topographic advantages 
of the coastal regions in international trade and transportation are realized. As a result, 
returns to capital investment in the coastal regions are higher than in the rest of the 
country.  Thus more FDI and more migrant workers are attracted to the coastal regions, 
                                                 
2 There were about 77 million rural migrants working temporarily in cities in 2000 (Cai, 2003).   24
which fuels persistently higher than average growth rates there.  They use several 
variables (rather than a simple coastal dummy) to characterize the geographic factor in 
their empirical analysis.  The results strongly support the prediction of the model.   
Specifically, the coastline length of each province alone could account for 68% of the 
variations in economic growth across provinces between 1978 and 1997.  Demurger 
(2001) finds that the interaction between the coastal dummy and the time effect has a 
significant and positive impact on growth, which corroborates Chang et al. ‘s argument 
that the reforms help the coastal regions realize their geographic advantages.  Moreover, 
he finds that the degree of rural isolation has a negative effect on growth.   
     
3.7 Labor mobility and migration 
Although market-oriented reforms have made considerable progress in China during the 
past two and a half decades, a fully-fledged labor market approaching the flexibility of 
the major industrial nations is far from established.  There are still serious obstacles to 
labor mobility (Fleisher and Yang (2003)).  First of all, hukou remains a critical barrier to 
rural-urban and inter-city migration
3 .  Second, local protectionism arises due to 
decentralization.  Local governments impose various restrictions on immigration in order 
to protect the job security of local workers.  For instance, migrant families have to bear 
much higher cost for their children’s education.  Third, the lack of a well-developed 
social safety net, particularly unemployment insurance, health insurance and pension, 
discourages migration.  Fourth, the lack of well-developed complementary markets such 
as housing markets deters migration.  Lastly, it has been documented that rural migrants 
in urban labor markets suffer from discrimination in terms of both wage offers and 
occupational attainment (Meng and J. Zhang (2001)).     
      
Barriers to migration hamper economic growth.  It prevents labor movements from the 
lower productivity sector (agriculture) to the higher productivity sector (non-agriculture).  
Moreover, Au and Henderson (2002) show that restrictions on migration limit urban 
                                                 
3 As of today, according to Cai (2003), hukou reform is incomplete and its progress differs across provinces 
and even cities: 1) in over 20,000 small towns, applicants may receive local registration if they have a 
permanent source of living and housing in the locality. 2) In many medium-sized cities, including a few 
provincial capitals, requirements for gaining hukou status have been reduced; some just require a long-term 
work contract. 3) In mega-cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, it is very difficult to obtain hukou.   25
agglomeration and thus curb the productivity growth of cities in China.  In a related paper, 
Au and Henderson (2003) use a structural model to estimate urban agglomeration 
economies for 206 cities in China.  Their estimation generates an inverted U-shape 
relationship between city size and productivity.  They find that in 1997, only 7 cities were 
oversized, while 73 cities were undersized, resulting in substantial productivity losses.  
Because cities can serve as growth engines for surrounding regions through spillover 
effects, the spatial distribution of cities of different sizes has important implications for 
the pattern of regional economic growth.      
 
With the gradual removal of restrictions on migration in recent years, the volume of 
migration soars.  What is the impact of migration on regional inequality in China? On one 
hand, labor mobility is one of the major driving forces towards regional convergence.  
This should hold true for the case of rural-urban migration.  The rural-urban migration 
should reduce the rural-urban inequality.  On the other hand, there is a growing concern 
for the brain-drain problem caused by the inland-coastal migration.  Most emigrants from 
the poor inland to the rich coastal regions are young, educated and skilled, because 
people of this type face less de facto restrictions on migration.  They possess higher 
human capital per capita than the average levels of their hometown.  Considering that the 
coastal regions can keep attracting FDI (thus with almost unlimited supply of physical 
capital) and the inland regions have low levels of physical capital, the migration leads to 
no change in the capital (physical plus human) to labor ratio in the Coast while lowers 
capital to labor ratio in the Inland.  As a result, the gap between the Inland and the Coast 
widens.  The inequality could be further exacerbated when agglomeration economies are 
involved.  Fu (2004) discovers evidence showing that rural emigration from inland 
provinces exacerbates the inland-coastal inequality based on data over 1990—1999.    To 
obtain an overall picture of the impact of migration on regional inequality, further 




4.  Policy Implications.   26
The rising regional inequality presents great challenges to China’s social and economic 
stability.  Empirical studies in the literature throw light on the magnitude and 
mechanisms through which economic and policy variables influence the pattern of 
regional growth, which provides valuable guidance in search for solutions.  The 
following are some policy implications:  
  Promote the economic growth of less-developed regions through a set of new 
regional development strategies.  In 2000, the State Council of China set up a 
special committee to facilitate economic development in the West, along with a 
promotion program.    
 
  Lift restrictions on migration.  Encourage rural-urban migration.  In particular, the 
removal of the hukou system is crucial.     
 
  Establish various labor market institutions to facilitate labor mobility across 
locations and sectors.  Especially, it is vital to establish a well-functioning social 
security net including unemployment insurance, health insurance and pension. 
 
  Develop a system of cities to serve as growth engines for regional development. A 
reasonable spatial distribution of city size is important.  
 
  Develop integrated domestic markets by removing inter-regional trade barriers.   
As Fleisher and Yang (2003) point out, in order to reduce and eliminate local 
protectionism, the central market must understand the incentives that local 
governments need to cooperate with national laws and regulations.  Thus central 
policies should be drawn on a basis of incentive compatibility.  The central 
government in China has exerted various efforts in this direction, including the 
establishment of the Ministry of Internal trade whose main purpose is to ensure 
the smooth circulation and distribution of commodities nationwide; and mediate 
inter-regional trade conflicts. 
     27
  As an amendment to fiscal decentralization, 1) help finance or coordinate the 
production of public infrastructures such as highways and telecommunication 
networks that have large inter-regional externalities; 2) develop an effective 
mechanism of risk-sharing among regions to achieve the macroeconomic 
stabilization at the regional level. Aware of the problems of fiscal decentralization, 
China implemented another round of fiscal reforms in 1994 to recentralize 
revenues and strengthen the central government’s capacity to conduct its own 
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